

FOR RELEASE AT 6:00 P.M., SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1956

FROM THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator Eastland (D-Miss) released today the testimony of Seweryn Bialer, who until February of this year was a former top Communist propagandist in Poland. Mr. Bialer's testimony deals in part with his experiences in the Polish Communist Party, and sets forth some views on the present changes in Poland which are based on those experiences. These views afford one interpretation of events transpiring in Poland today.

Mr. Bialer's answers were given to the Subcommittee on Tuesday, October 30th.

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:55 p.m., in Room 317, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner

Also present: Robert Morris, Chief Counsel; Jay Sourwine, Associate Counsel; William A. Rusher, Administrative Counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research.

Senator Jenner. Mr. Karski, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that you will truthfully translate the questions and answers put to the witness, so help you God?

Mr. Karski. Yes, Senator.

Mr. Morris. What is your name?

Mr. Karski. Jan Karski, Professor, Georgetown University.

Mr. Morris. You have acted as interpreter for Mr. Bialer, have you not?

Mr. Karski. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Morris. All right.

Now, Senator, will you swear in Mr. Bialer?

Senator Jenner. Do you swear the testimony given at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bialer (through interpreter). I do.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, (THROUGH JAN KARSKI, INTERPRETER.)

Mr. Morris. Your name is Seweryn Bialer.

Mr. Bialer, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, in connection with its activities in trying to understand the full

- 2 -

nature of Soviet activity, Soviet and Communist activity here in the United States, is particularly interested in knowing something of the developments that are now taking place in Poland.

Among other things, we noticed that the American Communist Party, through its official organ, the Daily Worker, is applauding the activities of Gomulka and other Polish Communists who are taking what appears to be an independent course of action from the Soviet Union.

Now, because events abroad and events here in the United States are so closely interrelated, as you well know, we would appreciate, for our official record and under oath and based on your own long experience in the Polish Communist Party that you have related to us, we would like your interpretation of these events.

Mr. Bialer, I think you have made clear to us that there are two forces at work in Poland today. One is a force generated by the people and the workers for a liberalization, a relaxation, of the heavy control on the part of the Soviet-controlled Polish Communists that has existed.

That is one trend, is it not?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, basically, although I would add to it that this force wants not only a liberation from the Soviet Union but is also basically anti-Communist.

Mr. Morris. And then you have also told us, have you not, of a second force, and that is a force that operates within the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party, which tends to bring the Polish Communist Party more and more away from the tight central control that has existed in the past?

Have I stated that accurately?

Mr. Bialer. Basically yes, but I would add too that it is not only within the Politburo but within the whole Party.

Mr. Morris. The International Party, you mean?

Mr. Bialer. The Communist Party in Poland.

Mr. Morris. From the Politburo down?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, down.

Mr. Morris. At the present time, Mr. Bialer, which is the predominant of those two forces?

Mr. Bialer. I think that the direct cause of the present situation in Poland was the first cause, the popular movement, the popular feeling; and because of the strength of that force the present Party leadership could emerge.

Mr. Morris. And you have testified to that effect in your previous appearances before the Internal Security Subcommittee, have you not?

Mr. Bialer. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And since your last appearance you find that the trend which you forecast at that time is becoming even more pronounced?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, except that I was not so sure that Gomulka would come to power.

The fact that he came to power means a basic change in the reality in Poland.

Mr. Morris. Since your last appearance, then, the change that has emerged has been the growth of Gomulka?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, the most important event which took place in Poland in the last month was that the popular movement became even stronger and gave opportunity to Gomulka to get power within the Communist Party.

Mr. Morris. Now, Gomulka has always been a hard-core Stalinist Communist, has he not?

Mr. Bialer. I don't think one could say this. I think that in the years 1945-1948, Gomulka held views which later on were strengthened, and those views could not be branded as Stalinist views.

At that time, in the years 1945-'48, there was no possibility for his views to be implemented.

Naturally, basically he was always a Communist, always he was for dictatorship; but on very many issues he held views which could not be branded as Stalinist.

Mr. Morris. Now, I noticed the other day, Mr. Bialer, that there was a reported phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gomulka on relations between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government. Isn't it an unusual development that they should have released the text of a phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gomulka?

Mr. Bialer. It is a very extraordinary event and I understand it in this way: Gomulka, realizing the anti-Soviet feelings among the Polish masses, wanted the Polish masses to learn about the tenor of the conversation, knowing that it would strengthen his prestige and power.

Mr. Sourvine. Isn't it equally possible that Mr. Khrushchev would have had to assent to the making public of this telephone conversation before it would be done?

Mr. Bialer. One should not exclude any possibility, although as far as I know this is basically against the rules, which are that this kind of relation between the Communist leaders should not be known to the general public.

Now, the second proof is that, although the text of the conversation became known in Poland, it was withheld from the Soviet public opinion.

Mr. Morris. You have prepared for us, have you not, Mr. Bialer, a short paper, nine and a half pages of which I would like to make reference to at this point, and that is a sort of a sketch, a historical sketch of events leading up to the present crisis?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I would like to offer for the record at this time this paper, which I now show you.*

You have prepared this, have you not?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bialer, I know that you are uniquely qualified to testify about events in Poland because of your long experience in Poland, but in view of the fact that you also are a student of Communist affairs generally I wonder if at this time you would be willing to answer a few questions on the Hungarian situation?

Mr. Bialer. If I can, naturally it would be my pleasure to.

Mr. Morris. In your opinion has there been a trend developing in Hungary similar to that you have outlined in this paper here today?

* The portion of this statement placed in the record by Judge Morris is set forth at the end of the testimony.

Mr. Bialer. Yes, I am convinced that it applies also to the situation in Hungary, and this I say on the basis of my acquaintances with the Hungarian Communist leaders, as well as my status with respect to present reality.

Naturally, the basic difference is that in Hungary at the last moment, in the last days, a bloody revolt took place which did not take place in Poland.

And, of course, I would like you to keep in mind that the basic difference between the two situations. I would put it in this way; in Poland the present Communist leadership got to power half an hour before the revolt was to take place, and in Hungary half an hour after the revolt actually did take place.

If Gomulka had not taken power in Poland exactly at that time, most probably the same revolt would have taken place in Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying, in other words, that the accession of Gomulka prevented a revolt in Poland, whereas the accession of Nagy followed a revolt in Hungary?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, sir, exactly.

Mr. Morris. Therefore, it would seem to have the effect--the imposition of the Gomulka Government on the one hand and the Nagy Government on the other hand, were really attempts to put, as it were, a stove lid on this uprising that has taken place?

Mr. Bialer. Yes; both Gomulka and Nagy, identifying themselves with the anti-Soviet feeling among the masses, were a form of isolation against anti-Communist movements.

Mr. Morris. And in the case of Hungary the thing got completely out of hand, did it not?

Mr. Bialer. Yes; in Hungary Nagy came to power too late, you might say.

Mr. Morris. In other words, this device of keeping the lid on a popular insurrection succeeded in Poland and did not succeed in Hungary?

Mr. Bialer. I would say that in Poland it worked and in Hungary apparently it did not.

Mr. Morris. Do you feel that this trend, which you have told us about in your previous testimony and again here today, as well as in this short paper that you prepared for us--would you say that this trend is still operative in Poland?

Mr. Bialer. Yes. You mean independence from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Morris. No. By "this trend" I meant this drive on the part of the people to demand a certain amount of freedom and relaxation of controls.

Mr. Bialer. Not only am I sure that this continues, but it will gain in strength in time because there are better conditions for it.

Mr. Morris. Do you mean that as more relaxation of controls is granted to the people, the stronger will be their demands?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, sir, you are correct.

I would add this, that the Polish people for the first time have learned that they are strong--that they can win certain of their demands.

Before they were as if asleep under the Communist terror. Now they are, as if, awakened.

And I do believe that, once being awakened, they will continue this process.

-5-

Mr. Morris. Now, do you feel that this device of, as it were, a stove lid government, used to keep this thing under control, was something initiated by Khrushchev?

Mr. Bialer. I don't think so.

As far as I understand the situation it worked this way: Indeed after the death of Stalin Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership wanted certain minor changes which would deceive world public opinion as to the nature of the Soviet methods. However, once they started this, it got entirely out of their control and assumed such proportions that I could not identify the present state of affairs with their original initiative.

I would go further. I think that the present Soviet leadership will have to recognize the developments in Poland and in Hungary, although certainly it will not mean that they are satisfied with it.

They realize that they are too weak to put it down.

Mr. Morris. But they do have, as it were, the situation under control in Poland?

Mr. Bialer. I don't think that they have the situation in Poland under control presently.

I believe that Gomulka has under his control, at least partially, the situation in Poland. This does not mean, however, that it is the Soviet leadership which has it.

Mr. Sourwine. If, as you have described them, both Gomulka and Nagy are a sort of prophylactic against freedom, or as Mr. Morris has said, stove lids on the flame, if Khrushchev did not apply the prophylactic or put on the stove lid who did?

Mr. Bialer. Well, I would put it this way: I think that the leadership of the Polish Communist Party, all the leadership of the Communist Party--and for that matter also of the Hungarian Communist Party--do not like Gomulka or Nagy. They probably consider them as precisely stove lids, in this situation which has emerged in Poland.

However, they are forced by circumstances to recognize them.

Mr. Sourwine. They are using them for their own purposes, in other words?

Mr. Bialer. Yes. These people, they pushed Gomulka in order to save the situation, but they do not have any intention of identifying themselves with what Gomulka really is.

I consider that Gomulka really wants more freedom from Russia presently.

Mr. Sourwine. You make a distinction between wanting freedom and wanting freedom from Russia?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, yes, I think this is a big difference. What is freedom? It is freedom from Communism.

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead and explain that a little bit, will you?

Mr. Bialer. Gomulka is a Communist, but he wants the Polish Communist Party to be as much independent from the Soviet Union as possible. He wants to be a master in his own house and he wants his Party to be a master in their own house.

However, this I would differentiate from giving freedom, since he wants Communism to dominate in Poland, and this means the dictatorship of one Communist Party in Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say that Gomulka is interested in Polish freedom from Soviet domination if it does not also involve power for a Communist Party?

-6-

Mr. Bialer. Yes; I think that such is the reality, such was the development of events.

Although he came to power originally thanks to the support of the Soviet Union, finally he assumed the position which you defined.

Mr. Sourwine. I am afraid I don't have an answer that I understand yet.

I am trying to find out if you think that Gomulka divorces his own ambition for power from his desire to have the Communist Party of Poland sever its ties with Russia.

Mr. Bialer. Yes, sir, this is as you say.

Mr. Morris. Now, Nagy, the counterpart of Gomulka in Hungary, is the one who called on the Red Army to keep himself in power.

Would not that reflect a relationship, if Nagy is the counterpart of Gomulka, which would be slightly at variance with what you have told us today?

Mr. Bialer. Well, I don't think that I am at variance with my previous statement, since I maintain that the problem concerns only power, and both Gomulka and Nagy are prepared to use Soviet forces in order to maintain themselves in power.

The best proof is that in the years 1945-1948 it was exactly due to Soviet support that Gomulka got power in Poland.

But there is a difference of circumstances in Hungary and Poland. In the case of Nagy, in order to obtain power, he needed Soviet forces. Gomulka had a different situation. He got power without the help of Soviet forces, and having actually achieved power he does not need any more the Soviet forces.

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, you are saying that the maintenance of themselves in power is the important thing, the most important thing to both of these men?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, undoubtedly.

Whatever differences they have with the Soviet Union, they have one thing in common: it means maintenance of Communism.

Mr. Morris. Have you read the statement of Tito which is reported in the morning papers today?

Mr. Bialer. May I see it?

Yes, I read it before.

Mr. Morris. It would appear from the account of that statement which I have just shown you, Mr. Bialer, which appeared on page 20 of the New York Times for October 30, 1956, that Tito is opposed to the uprisings in Hungary.

Mr. Bialer. I understood it the same way.

Mr. Morris. The basis of his opposition to the developments, such as they were, in his opinion damaged socialism in general, as well as peace among nations.

Mr. Bialer. Yes. As far as I understood Tito's statement he condemns everything which took place in Hungary which would undermine the position taken by Nagy, which means everything that would undermine basically the Communist regime in Hungary.

Mr. Morris. Excuse me, did I understand you to say that Tito's position would be opposed to Nagy's position?

Mr. Bialer. No, Tito would oppose in Hungary all those forces which wanted to undermine basically the Communist regime as such--the national Communist regime.

Mr. Morris. But to speak concretely, the Nagy regime?

Mr. Bialer. The Nagy regime.

Mr. Morris. So that anything that went further than the imposition of the so-called stove lid government of Nagy in Hungary was the thing that drew opposition from Mr. Tito?

Mr. Bialer. As I understand it, Tito realized that in Hungary there are two streams--one powerful stream supporting a national Communism independent from the Soviet Union, and represented by Nagy, and the second stream which opposes Communism as such.

Tito supports the first force, which means national Communism headed by Nagy, and violently opposes all other forces which would like to strive against Communism.

This is what I understood from Tito's statement. Of course, I do not know if from one article we can understand the position of Tito as such, basically.

Mr. Morris. Yes, I understand the limitations, but Tito in the statement refers to "reactionary elements that use the present events for their anti-social aims." By those he means the people that would upset Nagy?

Mr. Bialer. That is the second stream I was speaking about, against which Tito pronounced himself.

Mr. Morris. Yesterday afternoon I had a session with a person who was a very important Soviet official but who defected from the Soviet organization. His defection, however, considerably antedates yours. But he did know on a very personal basis all of the top functionaries of the present Russian Communist Party. He interprets the present developments in this fashion. May I present his views and get your comments on that?

He believes that the top councils of the Soviet Union decided that they would be more effective in their efforts to control the whole world if they use the device of independent Communist parties. By using independent Communist parties they would be able to carry on their insurrectionary work in the various countries of the free world without the stigma of Moscow. And it is his contention that a very small group being privy to this plan could carry on and accomplish the present results, whereas at the same time the rank and file of the Party would not necessarily have to be privy to that development.

I wonder, Mr. Bialer, if you could give your view, in juxtaposition to this other view?

Mr. Bialer. I find one weakness in this type of speculation. This speculation takes it for granted that a kind of a plot in an elite group, a small number of people, can decide the issue, while as we know the masses came into play presently and of course the masses complicated entirely the picture.

It does not work as that small group of people planned it to work, even if it was true that they did it.

However, I must stress that the gentleman is absolutely correct when he says that such were the plans of the Soviet leadership.

I remember in 1954, when still I was in Poland, that the official line was: Poland is an independent country. That means that we were required to say to the world that Poland is an independent country. However, the difference is that at that time Poland was not an independent country, while today there are certain changes in Poland.

So, I would conclude in this way: Whatever were the plans--and plans there were, as that gentleman told you--the reality developed in a different way. It got out of control. The masses entered the picture and now the situation is not as planned but as the masses dictate.

-8-

The strategy of Khrushchev basically wanted events to go in this direction, but the reality got out of control, new factors entered the picture, and things went much further than they wanted them to go.

This is why I doubt if what is actually happening behind the Iron Curtain could be called Soviet strategy.

Mr. Morris. We had an instance last week of a refugee, a Polish refugee, returning to Poland, and we noticed that the arrangements for that were handled by the Soviet Embassy here in Washington.

That situation, Mr. Bialer, points up the primary concern of the Internal Security Subcommittee with these developments. It is of prime importance to the Subcommittee that we analyze the various activities of the officials in the Hungarian Legation, the Soviet Embassy, and the various delegations to the United Nations.

Don't you think that the fact that the Soviet Union handled the re-defection of a Polish immigrant was of some significance at this time?

Mr. Bialer. I couldn't give you, sir, any specific answer, since I consider that this specific case does not provide me any material. I would have to know who the immigrant was, what the circumstances were, and so on. Perhaps such a procedure was necessary.

I have not enough material to pronounce myself one way or the other.

Mr. Sourwine. I should like to ask this. First, as a preliminary matter, we all know it's very difficult to know what a political-reality is. If Mr. Gomulka does something which we presume Mr. Khrushchev wants him to do, we never know whether he does it because Gomulka wants to do it or because Khrushchev wants Gomulka to do it.

On the other hand, there is a reality which we can look at, and that is the matter of military control. The Soviets control the military in Poland, and they control the military in Hungary. Their own forces are in Hungary. They have Rokossovsky in charge of the Polish Army. They massacred the flower of the Polish Army at Katyn.

The purpose obviously, or a major purpose, at least, was to emasculate the Polish Army as a Polish force and to create a situation in which Soviet officers would be in the top echelon. And that situation has been created.

Now, would you agree that as long as the Soviet Union controls the military with its own forces or, as in the case of Poland, with its own officers, there can be very little freedom in that nation from the Soviet Union, in the last analysis?

Mr. Bialer. Yes, I understand your reasoning, sir, where you are driving at, and I am in full agreement with you.

But the situation in Poland, as I see it presently, does not respond to your description. Rokossovsky is no longer Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. He left. He left yesterday. His successor is definitely Gomulka's man.

The control of the Polish Army is no longer exercised by a man who is outside of the Polish Communist Party, as was Rokossovsky; it is directly under the leadership of the Polish Communist Party.

As far as we can suppose from Gomulka's statements, the so-called Soviet experts are in the stage of leaving Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. You say that Rokossovsky is no longer Commander-in-Chief of the Army?

Mr. Bialer. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Who took his place?

Mr. Bialer. Bordzilowski, and above all Sychalski, both Gomulka's supporters.

Sychalski was in jail several years for anti-Stalinism and Bordzilowski is a genuine Polish general--well, that word "genuine"--I do not remember now

-9-

exactly his past, but I am sure I could put it this way: he is not a Soviet general.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say that this presages the withdrawal of the Soviet officer corps in the Polish Army and the turning over of top command throughout the Army to Polish officers?

Mr. Bialer. I am deeply convinced of this.

Mr. Sourwine. If that is done what would you say it means?

Mr. Bialer. I interpret it this way: that indeed Gomulka and his followers want a genuine internal independence from the Soviet Union and want to have full control of the Polish armed forces themselves.

Mr. Sourwine. In the same vein, do you foresee the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Hungary?

Mr. Bialer. I think that this is more than probable.

Mr. Morris. At any rate, a gauge of your view will be whether or not there will be an early evacuation of Soviet forces from both those countries, will it not?

Mr. Bialer. I didn't understand.

Mr. Morris. A gauge of your interpretation will be whether or not there is an early withdrawal of Soviet forces from those two countries?

Mr. Bialer. We are speaking about Hungary and Poland now?

As far as Poland is concerned, I do not believe that the Soviet divisions will be withdrawn from Poland.

But I believe that the leadership of the Polish Army will be taken by the Polish Communists.

As far as Hungary is concerned, it seems to me that the Soviet forces will indeed leave Hungary.

As for the degree to which the reality proceeds as I thought, I remember around one week ago there was a general conviction here that Rokossovsky would be Minister of Defense. I was stating publicly that he would not be Minister of Defense, that they would liquidate him completely. And it happened yesterday. Although I must say that I did not foresee that the process would take place so soon. I thought that it would take place three months after the general elections, which are supposed to take place in January. Well, it took place yesterday.

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much, Mr. Bialer.

Thank you, Professor Karski, for assisting us once again.

(Whereupon, the Subcommittee adjourned.)

The portion of Mr. Bialer's statement placed in the record by Mr. Morris at page 3 appears below:

Development of Events

The beginnings of the most recent events in Poland are to be found in the second half of 1953. The development of events during the years 1953-1956 can be divided into the following periods:

First Period: Second Half of 1953 until the end of 1954:

During this period, discussions within the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) began, regarding errors in economic policy and, above all, the police methods of ruling the Party and the country. These discussions were not widely made public. There were not even mass discussions within the Party. The Party leadership was not personally attacked. The Party leadership, following the example of the Soviet Union, began limiting the power of the secret police. Even in this period these limitations were greater in Poland than in Russia.

-10-

Second Period: The end of 1954 until the beginning of 1956.

This period saw the ideological crisis within the Party develop with great force. Above all, this encompassed the Party intelligentsia. The discussions in the Party Activ began to develop even at official meetings. The voices of criticism began to reach the press. The criticism was very frequently directed personally against individuals from the Party leadership. The power of the security apparatus lessened even more. To a great degree it became isolated from the Party itself, where the concealed aversion to the security apparatus began to break out to the surface. The Party leadership was forced under the pressure of the Party Activ on the highest levels to declare democratization and a change in policies, but it retreated, only step by step and began to introduce these changes into life only with great delays and inconsistencies. Frequently the attempts made by the Party leadership to restore calm to the Party Activ were unsuccessful. During the period 1955-56, opposition to the Party leadership grew significantly. Within the Party, the Party Activ achieved a rather large measure of freedom of activity in comparison to Russia and the other Satellite Countries -- this despite the wishes of the Party leadership. The following convictions resulted in the Party Activ:

Either Russia takes a serious step ahead, on the road to de-Stalinization, and in the meantime that which has already changed in the Party in Poland be sanctioned and develop further, or else nothing will change in Russia and in the meantime there will be a rightist-nationalist deviation in the Polish Party. It should be stressed that both in the first and in the second period, the movement against the Party leadership, and in part, against the Soviets, embraced in a mass fashion only the Party Activ and, above all, the party intelligentsia. The Party masses did not emerge from their lethargy and the overwhelming portion of the bureaucratic Party apparatus continued in its practical work forward, however, even to a lesser extent than was postulated in the speeches of the old leaders of the Party. The people just began to feel certain changes in the situation. Most of all they began to become less afraid--this because of the great lessening of police terror. They, however, were still distrustful of these changes. They saw no conditions permitting action and they did not know how to overcome their many years of silence. The crisis which was developing within the Party was concealed from the people by various means.

Third Period: From the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Until June 1953.

Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign which developed in a controlled, predetermined manner in the Soviet Union, evaded the control of the leadership in Poland. The internal Party crisis broke through to the top and encompassed the entire Party. Bierut's absence increased the crisis. The chief force in the Party stepping out against the leadership continued to be the Party intelligentsia. For the first time, however, in the whole post-Stalin period, the masses began to move. The distressing economic situation which resulted from the Six Year Plan and the frequent promises of improvement after Stalin's death was especially felt as the police terror was fundamentally weakened.

Fourth Period: June 1956 - October 1956.

At the VIIIth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in October 1956, the Politburo presented its resignation to the Central Committee. Personnel changes in the Politburo were not accomplished through the removal of certain members and co-opting new ones, but in the form of removing the existing Politburo and electing a new one in its entirety. This is a fact of great importance, characterizing the situation which unfolded in Poland from June to October 1956. The form in which the election of the new Politburo was accomplished is unheard of. With this it should be remembered that a Party Congress is to be held in March. Hence there was the possibility of a painless evolutionary changing of the Politburo. The change was accomplished, however, in the severest form. This in reality rules out an evaluation of these events which would state that this was a predetermined plan. This was a change resulting from a struggle and a critical situation.

What forced the Politburo to a collective resignation -- in other words, what developed in the period from June to October 1956? It appears that the following were the factors:

-11-

a. A basic undermining, and in many aspects, loss of control by the Party over life in Poland. The most active strata of non-Party individuals ceased being afraid. The Poznan events were only a small example of the tremendously explosive popular sentiment which arose in connection with political and economic matters, and was approaching the point of explosion. The hatred of the Polish people existed even in past years but, for the first time, conditions arose which threatened its explosion. The decline of the authority of the State and of the leadership of the Party among the people on the basis of the bankrupt policies of the leadership during the past 10 years, the weakening of terror as well as irresolution in its present policies, was tremendous. It appears that this was the basic fact, without which Gomulka's return as First Secretary, in the fashion in which it was accomplished, would not have been possible.

b. The decline of the Politburo's authority in the Party itself. The dissolution of Party discipline had gone so far that the principle which is the condition of the existence of the Party, namely, the principle that, despite various views, once resolutions were made they must be followed, was undermined publicly. The dissolution of Party discipline and the decline of the Politburo's authority led not only to the fact that the control of the Party slipped out of the hands of the leadership but it also made the mastering of the situation among the people unusually difficult. The Party was no longer a well-oiled machine executing orders of the leadership against the people. If we speak of the rank-and-file of Party members, of whom the overwhelming portion was never Communist but entered the Party either under force or for economic gain or for career purposes, then this mass of the membership diffused, so to speak, among the people and lost its separate identity.

c. The decided opposition against the Party leadership on the part of the Party intelligentsia which, in many articles in the press, expressed in reality a vote of no confidence regarding the leadership, did not recognize its leadership, and more important, passed from discussion to practical activity. The Party intelligentsia transformed itself from being a connecting link between Party leadership and the Party and the people, to a group separating the Politburo from the Party and non-Party individuals.

d. There was lack of unity in the Politburo, divergence of opinion, lack of a figure with sufficient authority and popularity who could unify the Politburo. In such an intense period, the Politburo did not have a clear program of action or a platform for change. The situation demanded -- if everything was not to disintegrate -- a decisive program, even a Stalinist one, which with the aid of terror could attempt to master the situation, or a program of far-reaching changes which would prevent an outburst and would eventually permit the recovery of leadership within and beyond the Party. In the meantime, the policies of the Party leadership during the period June--October was a policy of stabilization. Hence, a policy which was not one in favor of withdrawal, but at the same time, one indecisive in regard to further developments. Hence this was not a policy of real power. It appears that the wavering and lack of a platform of action by the Politburo resulted among other things from divergence within the Politburo, indecision, the burdens of the past and lack of strength in its various components. Beyond this, even if some group or individuals in the Politburo had a decisive program for a change, perhaps one no different than the present platform of Gomulka, it is possible that they lacked authority to bring about its realization.

e. The lack of unity in the Central Committee and the decline of authority of the Politburo in the Central Committee. The Central Committee could be persuaded but it could no longer be dictated to. A part of the Central Committee stopped believing that the situation in Poland could be mastered by the directorship of the then reigning Politburo.

f. The actual situation in Poland and in the Soviet Bloc had immense significance. First, the crisis of the Polish economy and the political forms of ruling Poland were revealed with great force. Secondly, the weakening of Soviet control and the decline of the authority of the Soviet leadership had developed to the point where publicly announced orders by the Moscow dictators were sometimes disregarded. (For example, Bulganin's command, included in his speech of 22 July 1956 in Warsaw.)

-12-

Dynamic Forces Behind the Incidents in Poland.

In the present situation in Poland, two dynamic forces led to the existing state of affairs.

The first force is the active pressure exerted for the first time since the war by large groups of people, especially factory workers and working and university youth. The basic character of this pressure is anti-Soviet, favoring full independence of Poland from the Soviet Union. It is also anti-Communist. It should be stressed, however, that the anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland is of greater strength than anti-Communist feelings. At the present time, the chief enemy is the Soviet Union.

The second force is the pressure exerted by a large segment of the Party against the Soviet Union for the acquisition of independence from the Soviet Party in internal matters. Its aim is greater freedom within the Party in public life and a serious reorganization of the economic structure of the country. The main stress is on internal reforms. The question of separation from the Soviet Union is only a necessary pre-condition for this.

The two dynamic forces came together and, in some cases, blended under the impact of present incidents in Poland. For a certain period of time, their interest became the same. In practice, a temporary alliance was concluded joining both forces in the matter of gaining a greater measure of independence from the Soviet Union. The degree to which both of these forces want independence from the Soviet Union is different. The reason why both of these forces want independence from the Soviet Union is also different, but for the present moment they have a common avenue of action.

The objectives of these two forces in internal matters are, generally speaking, completely different, but again the direction of their activity has, at the present moment, a number of common points. These are not opposed to the objectives of the people, that is, the internal changes in the economy and the political life which are desired by groups in the party who have come out in favor of changes. The people do not want to stop at these changes, because they are opposed to Communism even if it is improved.

The two forces which were mentioned above are not isolated from each other. They mutually react on one another. The principal directions of this reaction could be described in the following manner:

The influence of the attitudes and activities of the people on the changes desired by groups in the Party depends primarily on the fact that, as to date, the Party is being forced in the direction of more responsible activity. Proposals are put forth which go further than the Party itself would want. This favors putting forth at the lead the most radical elements in the Party and in the leadership who, without the existence of the first force, would never so easily have obtained their present position and would not have so strong a position. As far as Gomulka is concerned, it would seem very unlikely that, without the existence of the tremendous pressure of the first force, he could have achieved his present position. Hence, with the existence of this first force, he found support not only from the side of his adherents in the Party but also from the side of many opponents who saw in him a lightning-rod which could absorb the more threatening incidents and could weaken the anti-Communist pressure of the first force. Parenthetically speaking, the difference between Hungary and Poland is based, among other things, on the fact, that, in Poland, Gomulka achieved power before the revolutionary outbreak in the Capital and fulfilled to a large extent the role of a lightning-rod. In Hungary, on the other hand, Imre Nagy was brought to power in the course of the revolutionary outbreak and was incapable of mastering the situation. Beyond this, the influence of the first force results in the fact that the Party has a stronger position in dealing with Moscow. (This applied, above all, to such a situation where the first force does not lead to mass anti-Communist uprisings.)

The opposite influence of the activity and work of segments of the Party who desire change, on the activity and attitudes of the population is such that, if the desired changes favored by elements of the Party come to the fore, and are sufficiently radical, they will ameliorate the anti-Communist activity by the population. This is for the short-run at the present time. By placating certain demands of the people and setting forth prospects of righting the political and economic situation, they help neutralize the anti-Communism of the first group or, strictly speaking, defer its expression to

-13-

the future. It seems, however, that the long-range effect of deferring the solution of this problem, can be different inasmuch as it will embolden the first force and create a better climate for its activity.

Inasmuch as, in the present situation in Poland, there occurred a temporary alliance of both forces, it is certain that, together with this development, a moment must come when the first force will press forward and the second force will not want to move ahead. And hence, the time will come when the permanent contradictory interests outweigh the temporary coalescence of interests. It seems that, given the situation which now obtains, it cannot be said that there must come at this moment a stoppage of further changes by the Party. Under the constant pressure from the bottom and in strengthening the rightist forces in the Party, it is possible that there will be an evolutionary development which will transform Poland into a country of ever increasing elements of real democracy.

It appears that, for the most desirable development of events in the future, that is, such which could harm a retrogressive trend and simultaneously press the leaders continuously forward in the direction of change, it would be necessary to have a situation where the uprising of the masses would be a primary potential threat but that the movement of the masses would take a peaceful form but not an uprising such as took place in Hungary.

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